United States Government Policy for Stopping High-Risk Life Sciences Research

On July 20, 2026, the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) approved the United States Government Policy for Stopping High-Risk Life Sciences Research (High-Risk Life Sciences Policy). This policy was developed in response to EO 14292, “Improving the Safety and Security of Biological Research,” and it replaces the 2024 United States Government Policy for Oversight of Dual Use Research of Concern and Pathogens with Enhanced Pandemic Potential.

While life-science research is necessary to ensure the United States maintains global leadership in biotechnology, biosecurity, and health and agricultural research, as well as readiness against biological threats, it must be conducted responsibly and with appropriate safeguards. This risk-based policy prohibits federal funding for life sciences research that poses the highest societal risks without commensurate benefits. Such research includes dangerous gain-of-function (DGOF) research and international research of concern (IROC).

The High-Risk Life Sciences Policy also strengthens oversight of life-sciences research by promoting safe research practices, preventing biosafety incidents that could have negative societal consequences, safeguarding knowledge related to high-risk experiments, and improving accountability across the life sciences research enterprise. The policy outlines updated oversight, audit, enforcement, and transparency mechanisms to prevent dangerous gain-of-function (DGOF) and other risky research from being conducted or funded by the United States Government.

The policy combines multiple, complex and subjective policies into a single, clear standard that creates accountability among researchers, institutions, and funding agencies. Under this policy, each entity involved in the research process must review and attest the research does not meet the policy’s prohibited categories before funding or work may proceed. The High-Risk Life Sciences Policy will improve transparency and restore public trust in the life-science research enterprise; a public-facing independent third-party review body will ensure that potentially dangerous research is rigorously and impartially evaluated.

This policy is not intended to impede researchers’ ability to conduct or publish basic or applied research. Such research can improve public health or national security; advance agricultural practices, biotechnology innovation, or biomanufacturing; or promote implementation of biosafety and laboratory biosecurity best practices. Nor does this policy prohibit development of essential medical products and medical countermeasures to protect against bioterrorism. Rather, the policy will streamline oversight processes for life-science research that may pose high levels of risk and will encourage risk-informed approaches through the research and development lifecycle.